The substantial within-industry variation in firm productivity typically observed in the data suggests that there is ample scope for productivity catch-up by laggard firms. We analyse the normative effects of such catch-up. In the short run, where firms' process technologies are fixed, catch-up can reduce social welfare if the initial productivity gap between firms is sufficiently large (the Lahiri/Ono effect). However, in the long run, where firms invest in process R&D to maximize profits, social welfare jumps upwards following catch-up if it causes the major firm's R&D spending lead to grow. Both qualitative insights appear quite general.
Introduction
Our starting-point is the stylized fact that within-industry variation across¯rms in productivity is typically very large. For the UK, Haskel and Martin (2002) examine productivity dispersions within manufacturing industries over 1980-2000. They show that, in 2000, the average labour productivity gap in manufacturing industries between the 90th and 10th percentile plants was above 5 to 1. The same gap in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) was about 1.6 to 1. 1 Moreover, Haskel and Martin show that, if anything, the typical productivity spread in UK manufacturing increased between 1980 and 2000. Oulton (1998) provides two speci¯c senses in which the productivity spreads within UK manufacturing industries are \large." First, using company accounts data for the whole UK economy, Oulton shows that, in 1993, dispersion across¯rms in labour productivity was about 50% higher than in weekly earnings. Second, Oulton shows that about three quarters of labour-productivity dispersion across¯rms is due to di®erences in productivity between¯rms in the same narrowly-de¯ned (i.e., 4-digit) industry. Moreover, although
Haskel and Martin restrict their attention to UK manufacturing, the stylized fact that within-industry productivity dispersion is \large" appears to be robust across both other broad sectors of the UK economy (e.g., services 2 ) and other countries (e.g., Dwyer, 1998, on US textile industries).
These large within-industry productivity gaps suggest that there is ample scope for laggard¯rms to catch up, in productivity terms, with industry leaders. In this paper, we analyse the welfare e®ects of productivity catch-up by laggards. We introduce a distinction in logical time between the short and long runs, and we examine the e®ects of catch-up over those two horizons. In the short run,¯rms' process technologies are given, and catch-up moves laggards towards the static industry technology frontier, whose position is determined by the industry leader's technology. However, in the long run, the industry's technology frontier can move outwards as a result of¯rms' R&D investment decisions, which are then endogenously determined to maximize pro¯ts. Therefore, our notion of short vs. long run has its counterpart in the familiar normative concepts of static vs. dynamic e±ciency (Tandon, 1984; Qiu, 1997) .
1
In reality, productivity catch-up by laggards can occur for a variety of reasons { for example, as a result of purposive actions by¯rms and governments, and due to \natural" processes of technology di®usion and imitation. One of the stated reasons why countries like the UK have been so keen to host foreign direct investment (FDI) is that foreignowned plants typically exhibit higher labour productivity than domestically-owned ones within the same industry (Gri±th et al., 2004) . 3 To the extent that domestic/foreign TFP di®erences underlie these observed labour productivity gaps, host governments hope that inward FDI will lead to foreign-to-domestic productivity spillovers, which improve the performance of domestic¯rms (GÄ org and Greenaway, 2004) . Moreover, independently of the foreign sector, leader-to-laggard spillovers can occur over time within an industry as laggards learn from leaders and technology di®uses (Malerba, 1992) . Finally, the deliberate actions of¯rms can contribute to bringing laggards up to date with industry best practice.
Joint ventures, technology licensing, and trade associations are all examples of mechanisms through which this can occur, and they are all empirically common.
Because our primary concern is not the incentives of governments and¯rms to foster catch-up by laggards, we do not model the catch-up process and its associated costs explicitly. 4 Rather, we take a degree of catch-up as given and investigate its normative e®ects. 5 To study the e®ects of \helping" minor¯rms to move towards the technology frontier, we model R&D competition in a two-stage duopoly: in the¯rst stage, the¯rms choose their investment levels in process R&D; and, in the second, they compete µ a la Cournot on the product market. The¯rms are asymmetric both initially (because their initial marginal costs di®er, as a result of pre-game history) and in terms of their investment opportunities in process R&D, which is a binary choice where the¯rms' R&D sunk costs and innovation sizes in general di®er. Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfection, and we restrict the inter-¯rm productivity gap to ensure that interior Cournot equilibria always exist. Our modelling structure therefore extends the familiar two-stage analyses of R&D competition (i.e., process R&D choices, followed by market competition) by relaxing 3 Ferrett (2006) surveys the empirical literature on domestic/foreign productivity gaps.
4 For a simple analysis of how foreign-to-domestic spillovers a®ect foreign¯rms' inward FDI incentives, and a discussion of possible spillover channels, see Ferrett (2005) .
5 Our welfare standard is \social welfare," the unweighted sum of industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus. Therefore, our results will have implications for the willingness of a benevolent government to promote catch-up. Obviously, if catch-up reduces social welfare then, even with costless policy intervention, it should not be promoted.
the conventional assumptions of initially symmetric¯rms and symmetric process R&D opportunities across¯rms. 6 Given the substantial within-industry productivity spreads typically oberved in the data, and discussed at the outset, we argue that this represents an important advance towards realism. 7 Our model complements that of Boone (2001) , who analyses the e®ect of marginal-cost asymmetries between¯rms on their willingness to bid for the patent on a process innovation, by allowing both¯rms to innovate simultaneously. 8 We begin by analysing social welfare in the short-run case where¯rms' process technologies are given. Here, \helping" the laggard (minor)¯rm by slightly reducing its marginal cost has an intuitive impact on the individual components of social welfare: consumers and the laggard¯rm itself both gain, but the productivity leader loses. However, when these e®ects are aggregated, social welfare falls if the productivity gap is su±ciently large. 9 The intuition for this perverse e®ect is that, due to strategic substitution on the product market in Cournot competition, the laggard¯rm steals business from the leader when it is \helped," which is a socially ine±cient redistribution of initial production. If the inter-¯rm productivity gap is su±ciently large, then the increased production costs on the output so redistributed can drag overall social welfare downwards.
Turning to the long run, where the¯rms choose their process R&D levels before Cournot competition, the normative e®ects of \helping" the laggard are more complex.
If slightly cutting the minor¯rm's marginal cost induces a change in equilibrium R&D decisions, then social welfare changes discretely (because process R&D investment itself is a discrete variable). If \helping" the minor¯rm causes (via changes in equilibrium R&D 6 Important papers in that literature that use these symmetry assumptions include Brander and Spencer (1983) , d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , Kamien et al. (1992) , Suzumura (1992) , and Leahy and Neary (1997) .
7 Mills and Smith (1996) make the important point that an asymmetric game is unnecessary to generate asymmetric equilibria and explain asymmetric observations. However, our model assumes asymmetries between¯rms in initial conditions (accumulated R&D stocks) and R&D choice sets for two reasons. First, such asymmetries appear empirically signi¯cant. Second, it seems reasonable to assume that accumulated R&D stocks (\initial conditions") are largely independent of the (possibly small) catch-up \intervention." Most obviously, the catch-up under analysis could be unanticipated. However, even if it was (at least partially) foreseen, the catch-up \intervention" may not have a®ected R&D investments in the past { e.g., because Knightian uncertainty (as opposed to risk) shortens¯rms' \objective" planning horizons. (See RÄ oller and Sinclair-Desgagn ¶ e, 1996, for discussion of the causes of inherited asymmetries.)
8 Our paper addresses similar questions within the \R&D competition" literature to those that Boone considers within the \patent race" tradition.
9 Lahiri and Ono (1988) ¯rst highlighted this e®ect. See also Zhao (2001). behaviour) the major¯rm's R&D spending lead over its rival to widen, then social welfare jumps upwards. 10 If it causes the major¯rm's R&D spending lead to grow, then reducing the initial (ex ante) productivity gap between the¯rms by \helping" the minor¯rm raises social welfare discretely because it widens the equilibrium (ex post) productivity gap. Because of strategic substitution in outputs, this widening provokes an e±cient reallocation (minor-to-major) of initial production levels.
We also explore, in the long-run case, the monotonicity properties of equilibrium social welfare in the minor¯rm's initial marginal cost. We are interested in isolating conditions under which equilibrium social welfare is monotonically decreasing in the minor¯rm's initial marginal cost so that \helping" it is always bene¯cial. If the minor¯rm invests in R&D, then social welfare is independent of its initial marginal cost because the speci¯ca-tion of the process innovation is independent of initial conditions. However, if the minor rm does not undertake R&D, then social welfare is U-shaped in its initial marginal cost, with an upward slope for a su±ciently large productivity gap (as explained above). Whilst the curvature, for any pair of R&D choices, of the social welfare function depends on thē rms' marginal costs and is independent of the level of any R&D sunk costs incurred (because these enter social welfare additively), the level of initial marginal cost at which the minor¯rm is indi®erent towards R&D is increasing in its R&D sunk cost. This occurs because \helping" the minor¯rm reduces the size of its process innovation and therefore also its willingness to invest in R&D. Therefore, if its R&D sunk cost is su±ciently small, the minor¯rm invests in R&D for all levels of its initial marginal cost where social welfare would otherwise be upward-sloping. In consequence, equilibrium social welfare is monotonically decreasing in the minor¯rm's initial marginal cost over intervals where the¯rms' equilibrium R&D choices are¯xed (and therefore equilibrium social welfare is continuous).
When the fact that, in a short-run context, \helping" minor¯rms could cut social welfare was¯rst pointed out (Lahiri and Ono, 1988) , the observation was used to rationalize the industrial policies pursued by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the postwar period, which often favoured major¯rms over minor ones. An example was MITI's practice of granting major¯rms better access to new (often imported) technologies, thus widening the gap between leaders and laggards (Lahiri and Ono, p. 1201) . 11 Such interventionist industrial policies are now much less popular with governments, and the predominant policy focus is on fostering \competition" (DTI, 2001 ).
Our analysis also highlights the potential long-run gains from intensi¯ed \competition," although the mechanism is perhaps unexpected. Intensifying \competition" by \helping" minor¯rms and narrowing the initial productivity gap can substantially boost long-run (equilibrium) social welfare if it causes the major¯rm's R&D spending lead to grow and thereby widens the long-run productivity gap. Therefore, an interesting relationship can be discerned between developments in formal research and in policy practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section formally describes our two-stage game of R&D competition and de¯nes our welfare measures. In section 3
we present the game's perfect equilibria and we analyse the e®ects of \helping" the minor rm, distinguishing between the cases where the major¯rm's R&D is cheap and costly.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
Model
We analyse R&D competition in a linear Cournot duopoly where the¯rms' cost structures are asymmetric using the following two-stage game of complete information. 12 In stage one, the duopolists simultaneously and irreversibly choose whether to invest in process R&D (R) or not (N). By investing in R&D,¯rm i 2 f1; 2g obtains a marginal production cost of c iR for a sunk cost of F i . If i does not undertake R&D, its unit production cost remains at its inital level of c iN > c iR . Therefore, in stage 1,¯rm i chooses between two combinations of marginal and sunk costs, (c iN ; 0) and (c iR ; F i ), where the latter can be thought of as the installation of a new machine. 13 We assume that c iR and c iN are independent, so varying c iN alters the size of the process innovation. 14 In stage two, the duopolists compete µ a la Cournot on the market for a homogeneous 11 In a similar vein, Eatwell (1982, pp. 76-7) describes the purposive promotion of major¯rms by the French Commissariat G ¶ en ¶ eral du Plan during the same period.
12 By \linear," we mean linear demand and constant marginal cost.
13 Note that this discrete formulation of the R&D decision is consistent with an underlying continuous R&D investment variable if the¯rm optimally chooses corners { e.g., if¯rm i chooses R&D investment level x i 2 [0; 1], marginal cost equals c iN ¡ (c iN ¡ c iR ) x i , and R&D costs x i . good with inverse demand
There are two principal justi¯cations for our assumption of homogeneous products. First, given that we believe our qualitative insights will readily generalize to the case of differentiated products, it keeps our analysis mathematically straightforward. 15 Second, empirical evidence (Oulton, 1998) suggests that most of the variation across plants in total factor productivity (TFP) is within-industry, rather than between-industry. This is perhaps surprising, but it makes our assumption that producers of the same good face di®erent R&D possibilities and costs plausible. 16 We solve the game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. To avoid extensive and unrewarding taxonomy, we make two assumptions on the marginal cost parameters. First, we assume nondrastic process innovations. 17 This restricts the spread of marginal costs and requires
where the LHS's are monopoly prices following R&D, so the conditions ensure that either rm's monopoly price under R exceeds its rival's initial marginal cost. Second, we shall assume that c 2N¸c1N , so that, initially, 1 is the \major"¯rm and 2 the \minor" one. This assumption entails no loss of generality. It merely excludes cases that are distinguished only by¯rm labelling. We denote¯rm i's variable pro¯ts in Cournot equilibrium by
Using this notation, our game's payo® matrix is
We shall de¯ne social welfare as the unweighted sum of pro¯ts and consumer surplus, which is given by
Although our qualitative results survive with di®erentiated products, quantitatively they will be weakened because a key mechanism behind our results is strategic substitution in the product market (but see also footnote 12).
16 Moreover, the assumption of homogeneous goods facilitates straightforward comparison with the Lahiri/Ono (1988) analysis. Our qualitative results readily generalize to the case where p = a ¡ b (q1 + q2). 6 at an interior Cournot equilibrium. S is increasing and strictly convex in (q 1 + q 2 ): a given rise in industry output (i.e. a given fall in p) is more valuable to consumers, the larger is the initial output that the price fall is spread over. Fig. 2 plots the game's perfect equilibria in (F 1 ; F 2 )-space. The comparative statics are intuitive { increasing a¯rm's sunk cost of R&D makes it less likely to undertake R&D.
Analysis
The inter-regional boundaries are de¯ned as follows:
s gain in variable pro¯ts from investing in R&D when its rival chooses R (N). F ¤ iN > F ¤ iR because by investing in process R&D a¯rm's rival becomes a tougher competitor, which reduces the rent available on the product market to fund thē rm's own R&D e®ort. 18 Note that we cannot in general say whether
We are interested in the normative e®ects of \helping"¯rm 2 by reducing c 2N . We start by ignoring the endogenous R&D aspect and focus on the (N; N) case. The industry's technology frontier is represented by c 1N , and policy can promote catch-up by reducing c 2N towards it. Social welfare is given by
The key point to note (Lahiri and Ono, 1988 ) is that W (N; N) is not decreasing in c 2N on the whole interval of c 2N that is consistent with interior Cournot equilibria, i.e.
18 Therefore,¯rm i's dominant strategy is R if
, then i optimally chooses the opposite to its rival. In the central square in Fig. 2 , we have a game of chicken where either¯rm prefers the equilibrium where it does the R&D.
19 Two cases where ranking is possible deserve mention, however. First, if c 1R = c 2R (i.e., R&D moves both¯rms onto the new technology frontier), then
is su±ciently large, then increasing c 2N increases social welfare { or, equivalently, \helping minor¯rms reduces welfare." This result seems paradoxical, and it arises because thē rms' outputs are strategic substitutes in our linear Cournot model. To see this, assume for the moment that q 1 is¯xed and that market equilibrium is established by 2 acting as a monopolist on the residual demand curve. A rise in c 2N will lead to a fall in industry output (equal to the fall in q 2 ) and a fall in ¼ 2 . Moreover, society will be harmed because the loss to consumers exceeds the rise in ¼ 1 (which is itself a transfer from consumers) since consumers face a higher price on total industry output. Strategic substitution in Cournot competition alters this story as follows: the rise in c 2N leads to a fall in industry output (and ¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ; S all move in the same directions as before) but q 1 rises as q 2 falls { there is an e±cient redistribution of inital production from¯rm 2 to¯rm 1.
is su±ciently large, the welfare gain from redistributing production across¯rms is large enough to overturn our initial intuition. 21 22 Therefore:
Proposition 1 (Lahiri and Ono, 1988) : In a linear Cournot duopoly with both¯rms active in equilibrium, social welfare is U-shaped in the minor¯rm's marginal cost.
We characterize Proposition 1 as a short run result because it holds the¯rms' R&D policies¯xed. In the long run,¯rms' R&D investments are variable, and we need to consider the e®ects of changing c 2N on R&D investment patterns. For any (F 1 ; F 2 ) in Fig. 2 , reducing c 2N will shift inwards all the inter-regional boundaries except F ¤ 1R , which is independent of c 2N . The possibility therefore arises that, for given (F 1 ; F 2 ), cutting c 2N may alter equilibrium R&D decisions. F ¤ 2R and F ¤ 2N both fall when c 2N falls because the size of the process innovation that R&D investment grants¯rm 2 falls { recall that, by assumption, c 2R is independent of c 2N . F ¤ 1R is independent of c 2N because when 2 undertakes R&D, technology c 2N is eliminated from production. Finally, F ¤ 1N also 20 See, for example, the plot of W (N; N ) in Fig. 4 .
22 Despite our focus on Cournot competition, we would obtain qualitatively identical results under Bertrand competition with di®erentiated products. In that case, helping the minor¯rm will push both rms' prices downwards (strategic complementarity), bene¯ting the minor¯rm and consumers but harming the major¯rm. However, the minor¯rm's relative price will also fall, which will cause an ine±cient reallocation of initial production (major to minor). Likewise, Propositions 2 and 3 below will also generalize to Bertrand competition with di®erentiated products. falls when c 2N falls. This re°ects the fact that, with lower c 2N , 1's output is smaller in Cournot equilibrium for either of 1's R&D decisions. Therefore, the value of a given process innovation to 1, innovation size spread over equilibrium output, falls when c 2N
falls. 23
With endogenous R&D decisions, there are two cases to consider, \small" and \large" F 1 . Formally, the distinction depends on whether F 1 ? F ¤ 1R . Economically, it is the distinction between the case where 1 always undertakes R&D and that where 1's R&D decision is contingent on 2's.
3.1 Major¯rm's R&D is cheap:
, which is independent of c 2N , then 1's dominant strategy is to invest in R&D. Therefore, there are two possible perfect equilibria (see Fig. 2 ): (R; R) for F 2 < F ¤ 2R , and
In words, if c 2N = ®, then¯rm 2 is indi®erent between (R; R) and (R; N). If c 2N > ®, 
23 Our assumption of nondrastic process innovations is crucial for @F ¤ 1N =@c2N > 0. If 1's innovation were drastic, we would get @F ¤ 1N =@c2N < 0 because 1's pro¯ts in (R; N ) would be independent of c2N . Therefore, intensi¯ed competition weakens (strengthens) the incentive to invest in nondrastic (drastic) process innovations. This observation has implications for the impact of competition on chosen innovation size (drastic vs. nondrastic) and, perhaps, for the distinction between Schumpeter Mark I and II (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Breschi et al., 2000) . Proof: If c 2N · ®, then¯rm 2 prefers (R; N) to (R; R), so a su±cient condition for
This condition ensures that the rest of society (i.e.,¯rm 1 plus consumers) prefers In particular, Lemma 1 means that W (R; N) > W(R; R) at c 2N = ® where 2 is indi®erent between R and N, so there is a jump upwards in social welfare when c 2N is pushed below ®. This property is purely driven by the welfare e®ects on the rest of society (because¯rm 2 is indi®erent), and it arises because of the strategic substitution in Cournot equilibrium and consequent e±cient redistribution of intial production levels caused by a rise in 2's marginal cost from c 2R to c 2N when 2 abandons R&D (as in Proposition 1).
The second noteworthy feature of Fig. 3 is an artefect of the chosen cost parameters:
the switchpoint ® lies to the left of the turning point of W (R; N), which implies that \helping"¯rm 2 always increases social welfare. Speci¯cally, this second property requires that F 2 be su±ciently small. To understand this, note that the curvature of a given W (¢; ¢) function is independent of the sunk costs F 1 ; F 2 because they enter social welfare additively. However, the switchpoints between di®erent R&D regimes in equilibrium do vary with the sunk costs of R&D. Therefore, by increasing F 2 we would weaken 2's R&D incentive and eventually push ® to the right of the turning point in W (R; N) (see also the appendix¯gure). Proposition 2 sums up our results:
Proposition 2: In a linear Cournot duopoly with nondrastic process innovations where the major¯rm always invests in R&D, helping the minor¯rm increases social welfare discretely if it prompts the minor¯rm to abandon its R&D plans. Moreover, if the minor¯rm's R&D is su±ciently cheap, then helping it always increases social welfare in the long run.
It is useful to re°ect on the mechanism behind Proposition 2. If it causes the minor¯rm to abandon its R&D plans, then reducing the initial (ex ante) productivity gap between the¯rms by cutting c 2N raises equilibrium social welfare discretely because it widens the equilibrium (ex post) productivity gap and thereby provokes an e±cient reallocation of initial production levels.
Overall, this section has achieved two things. First, in cases where the¯rms' R&D decisions are unchanging so social welfare varies continuously with the minor¯rm's marginal cost, we have weakened the Lahiri/Ono result on the conditions under which \helping" the minor¯rm is harmful. Social welfare can increase in the minor¯rm's marginal cost only if its sunk cost of R&D (and therefore ®) is su±ciently large. Second, we have shown that helping¯rm 2 causes a jump upwards in social welfare at the point where 2 shelves its R&D plans as¯rm 1 grows at the expense of 2 on the product market. In the next section we consider the case of costly major-¯rm R&D.
3.2 Major¯rm's R&D is costly:
If F 1 > F ¤ 1R , then there are three possible perfect equilibria: (N; R), (R; N), and (N; N). We begin by tying down the equilibria at the extremes, c 2N = c 2R and c 2N = (1 + c 1R ) =2, 1's monopoly price following R&D. For any (F 1 ; F 2 ) with F 1 > F ¤ 1R , the perfect equilibrium when c 2N = c 2R is (N; N) . 28 (We shall assume throughout this section that c 2R > c 1N , so the constraint c 2N > c 1N never bites. 29 ) At the top end, where c 2N = (1 + c 1R ) =2, so 2 is pushed out of the market if 1 innovates alone, we shall assume
= 0 { 1's incentive to innovate is independent of 2's choice, and 2 has no incentive to invest in R&D.
29 c2R > c1N rules out leap-frogging (whether or not the leader undertakes R&D) { laggards must¯rst catch up with leaders before overtaking them. It seems a sensible assumption given the very large withinindustry variation in TFP across¯rms that is typically observed in the data (Haskel and Martin, 2002) . It implies that 1's R&D activity is innovative, having the e®ect of moving the industry's technology frontier outwards, whereas 2's is purely imitative, concerned only with catch-up. (2's R&D activity would combine both types if c1N > c2R.) so the perfect equilibrium is (N; R) (see Fig. 2 ). 30
Starting at c 2N = (1 + c 1R ) =2 with an equilibrium of (N; R), \helping"¯rm 2 shifts
and F ¤ 2N all inwards as the returns to innovation fall. Developing the notation from the previous section, we de¯ne two critical levels of c 2N to make¯rm 2 indi®erent between N and R:
here (see plot in appendix)
® was de¯ned above. In similar manner, if c 2N >¯, then¯rm 2 strictly prefers (N; R) to 
In each sequence, the labels below the arrows indicate the switchpoints. Think of sequences I, II and III as corresponding to large, intermediate and small F 1 =F 2 respectively (i.e., di®erent relative R&D costs). Qualitatively, sequence I is identical to the analysis of the previous section, and the observations summed up in Proposition 2 all apply (see Lemma 2(a) for a proof that equilibrium social welfare jumps upwards at c 2N =¯). The only di®erence is that 1 always chooses N, rather than R.
30 The cases where, for any subscripts, F > F ¤ for all permissible c2N represent subsets of our results. 
whenever (N; N) is the unique perfect equilibrium given that
whenever (R; N) is a perfect equilibrium given that
Proof: (a) If c 2N ·¯, then¯rm 2 prefers (N; N) to (N; R), so a su±cient condition for
This condition ensures that the rest of society (i.e.,¯rm 1 plus consumers) prefers 1N + c 2N ). This condition ensures that the rest of society (i.e.,¯rm 2 plus consumers) prefers (R; N). Given that c 1N 2 (c 1R ; c 2N ], the su±cient condition holds: LHS = RHS at c 1N = c 1R , and
In particular, Lemma 2(a) shows that the transition from (N; R) to (N; N) in sequences I and II, which occurs at c 2N =¯, is associated with an upwards jump in social welfare.
This might seem paradoxical because the sum of marginal costs rises. The welfare change is the e®ect on¯rm 1 plus consumers of an increase in¯rm 2's marginal cost from c 2R to c 2N (¯rm 2, the \minor"¯rm, is itself indi®erent between (N; R) and (N; N) at c 2N =¯).
The jump arises because of strategic substitution on the product market {¯rm 1 expands at the expense of 2 when 2's marginal cost rises, which cuts production costs on the redistributed output. The same mechanism of strategic substitution, although working 13 in the opposite direction, contributes to the result in Lemma 2(b). In sequence III, the transition from (R; N) to (N; N) at c 2N =°is associated with a jump downwards in social welfare. The rise in 1's marginal cost from c 1R to c 1N would harm the rest of society at initial production levels. Strategic substitution on the product market strengthens this negative e®ect { 2 grows at the expense of 1 when 1 switches from R to N, which is an ine±cient redistribution of initial production.
In all three welfare comparisons in Lemmas 1 and 2, only one¯rm alters its R&D policy between the outcomes compared. Consequently, both Lemmas use the same method of proof. On the space where the¯rm whose R&D policy alters has a best response in favour of a given outcome, we de¯ne a su±cient condition for ranking social welfare in the two outcomes, which is based on the preference of the rest of society (i.e., consumers plus the¯rm with unchanged R&D decision). Moreover, in both Lemmas, we isolate conditions under which the outcome that maximizes Firm 1's R&D spending lead (over 2) is welfare-superior.
Lemma 3 di®ers from the previous two because both¯rms' R&D policies change across the outcomes compared, (R; N) and (N; R). Therefore, the method of proof also di®ers.
In moving between the equilibria (R; N) and (N; R), we certainly know that the¯rm that takes up (abandons) R&D gains (loses). The e®ect on consumers is unclear, depending on whether c 1R + c 2N ? c 1N + c 2R , which determines the price change. Lemma 3 aggregates these e®ects: 32
{ i.e., whenever (R; N) is a perfect equilibrium given that F 1 > F ¤ 1R .
Proof: c 2N¸°i s equivalent to 32 The condition c2R > c1N + (c1N ¡ c1R) =3 is more demanding than our \no leap-frogging" condition c 2R > c 1N . The two converge as the size of 1's process innovation tends towards 0.
14 Taken together, Lemmas 1, 2(b) and 3 imply that whenever (R; N) arises in equilibrium, it is associated with higher social welfare than the other three outcomes. 33 34
Strategic substitution plays a role in Lemma 3. To highlight it, consider the special case where F 1 = F 2 and the innovation size is common across¯rms () c 1R +c 2N = c 1N +c 2R ). 35 Together, these assumptions mean that the welfare comparison of (R; N) and (N; R) depends only on industry variable pro¯ts in the two cases. The common innovation size assumption means that industry output and price (and, therefore, consumer surplus and revenue) are the same in both cases. Therefore, W (R; N) > W (N; R) if and 2R ; c 1N ). Given our assumed ranking c 2N > c 2R > c 1N > c 1R , strategic substitution means that this condition holds because the spread of marginal costs is greater in (R; N) (Salant and Sha®er, 1999) . 36 Taking the results of the previous section and this one together, there are¯ve distinct transitions between equilibria that can be caused by helping¯rm 2. With \small" F 1 , the transition is (R; R) ! (R; N). With \large" F 1 , the transition in sequence I is (N; R) ! Mills and Smith (1996) , who show in a completely symmetric game of R&D competition in Cournot duopoly (i.e., c 1N = c 2N > c 1R = c 2R and F 1 = F 2 in our model) that if an asymmetric \chicken" equilibrium exists (i.e., only one¯rm does R&D), it is the welfare-optimal outcome. Of course, as in our analysis, this is only \second best" welfare optimality because Cournot competition on the product market is taken for granted. (However, for criticism of the robustness of the duopoly assumption in Mills/Smith, see Elberfeld, 2003.) 35 For this demonstration, we could let F1 < F2, but then our condition for W (R; N) > W (N; R) would be only su±cient. 36 The common innovation size assumption (ciN ¡ ciR = ± > 0) means that industry revenue is the same in (R; N) and (N; R). Therefore, given F1 = F2, W (R; N) > W (N; R) if and only if industry production costs are lower in (R; N). This requires c 1R q
, where q R 1 and q N 1 are 1's equilibrium outputs in (R; N ) and (N; R) respectively, and Q is the common level of industry output. Simplifying, the inequality becomes q In Proposition 3, the major (large)¯rm is 1, and the minor (small) one is 2. Firm i's spending on R&D belongs to f0; F i g, depending on whether i undertakes R&D. Firm 1's R&D spending lead is its spending on R&D minus¯rm 2's.
In addition to the discrete changes in social welfare that occur when helping¯rm 2 changes equilibrium R&D choices, there are also continuous changes in social welfare when equilibrium R&D policies remain unchanged. Social welfare in (N; R) is independent of c 2N because 2's marginal cost is c 2R . Social welfare in both (R; N) and (N; N) is Ushaped in c 2N for the reasons behind Proposition 1. As in the previous section, the curvature of a given W (¢; ¢) function is independent of the sunk costs F 1 ; F 2 , but the switchpoints between di®erent R&D regimes in equilibrium do vary with the sunk costs of R&D. Also as previously, by setting ® \su±ciently small" we can ensure that helpinḡ rm 2 always increases social welfare when equilibrium R&D choices are¯xed because a necessary condition for¯rm 2 to choose N is c 2N < ®. Of course, ® \small" requires F 2 \small," which is intuitive: by setting F 2 su±ciently small, we increase¯rm 2's willingness to invest in R&D and push the switchpoint where (N; R) ceases to be a unique equilibrium to the left of the turning points in W (R; N) and W (N; N).
Proposition 3 generalizes Proposition 2 to show that any slight narrowing of the initial (ex ante) productivity gap between the¯rms, c 2N ¡ c 1N , that leads to a widening of the equilibrium (ex post) productivity gap, by causing¯rm 1's R&D spending lead over¯rm 2 to rise, raises social welfare discretely. We have also uncovered an additional mechanism through which helping¯rm 2 can increase 1's R&D spending lead and social welfare. In the last section,¯rm 1 always undertook R&D, and the mechanism was that helping¯rm 2 caused it to abandon R&D. In this section, we have shown that helping¯rm 2 can cause both¯rms to change R&D actions. For example, assume in sequence III that whenever (R; N) and (N; R) both exist as equilibria, (N; R) is played. Then, when c 2N is pushed below¯, the equilibrium changes from (N; R) to (R; N), which produces a larger jump in social welfare than the transition (N; R) ! (N; N) . Pushing c 2N below¯makes N a dominant strategy for¯rm 2 and , in response,¯rm 1 takes up its R&D plans.
Conclusion
We have analysed the welfare e®ects of productivity catch-up by a minor¯rm in a duopoly.
The catch-up takes the form of a narrowing of the initial marginal-cost gap between the 16 ¯rms. In the short run, where the¯rms' process technologies are¯xed, \helping" the minor rm produces the Lahiri/Ono (1988) result. If the initial productivity gap is su±ciently large, then reducing the minor¯rm's marginal cost causes social welfare to fall because it causes a socially ine±cient reallocation (i.e., major-to-minor) of initial production.
In the long run, the¯rms' process R&D investments are endogenously determined to maximize pro¯ts. If \helping" the minor¯rm causes the major¯rm's R&D spending lead over its rival to grow (through changes in R&D investment patterns), then social welfare jumps upwards. By extending the major¯rm's R&D spending lead, reducing the initial productivity gap between the¯rms raises social welfare discretely because it widens the equilibrium productivity gap. This widening provokes a socially e±cient reallocation (i.e., minor-to-major) of initial production levels.
Although our quantitative results are derived using a rather stylized model, we believe that our qualitative insights will survive in more general contexts { e.g., for a broad class of cost/demand functions, and under Bertrand competition on the product market. The key mechanism behind our results is that \helping" the minor¯rm causes it to steal business from the major¯rm in product-market equilibrium, and this is a standard characteristic of oligopoly models. Given this expectation, our¯ndings are most clearly illustrated using a simple model. 
